Network Analysis to Identify Critical Links
for Relief Activities During Extreme
Weather Events
Project No. 20PUTA28
Lead University: University of Texas at Arlington

Final Report
August 2021

Disclaimer
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and the
accuracy of the information presented herein. This document is disseminated in the interest of
information exchange. The report is funded, partially or entirely, by a grant from the U.S. Department
of Transportation’s University Transportation Centers Program. However, the U.S. Government
assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the Project Review Committee, Loyd
Smith, Bill Wheeler, and Dr. Haizhong Wang.

i

TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. Project No.
20PUTA28
4. Title and Subtitle

2. Government Accession No.

Network Analysis to Identify Critical Links for Relief Activities
During Extreme Weather Events

3. Recipient’s Catalog No.
5. Report Date
Aug. 2021
6. Performing Organization Code

7. Author(s)
PI: Kate Kyung Hyun https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7432-8058
Co-PI: Stephen Mattingly https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6515-6813
GRA: Mehrdad Arabi https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3267-1362

8. Performing Organization Report No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address
Transportation Consortium of South-Central States (Tran-SET)
University Transportation Center for Region 6
3319 Patrick F. Taylor Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge,
LA 70803
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
United States of America
Department of Transportation
Research and Innovative Technology Administration

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)
11. Contract or Grant No.

13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Final Research Report
Aug. 2020 – Aug. 2021
14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes
Report uploaded and accessible at Tran-SET's website (http://transet.lsu.edu/).
16. Abstract
As one of the principal lifeline systems, transportation networks are crucial for evacuation and delivering essential
resources and services during the response and recovery phases of extreme weather events and must remain intact to
enhance regional resiliency. The conventional evaluation measures that estimate the vulnerability or criticality of road
network based on travel time or link volumes do not capture the community impacts due to disruptions. This study
seeks to develop a framework to evaluate road network infrastructure criticality during extreme weather events by
introducing measures that evaluate the vulnerability of roads users, rather than the physical aspects of link importance.
The research develops an innovative approach that integrates three important concepts including hurricane evacuation
behavior, community impacts, and road criticality to identify the critical links. Results show that the critical links for
vulnerable populations during evacuation do not always align with conventional link-based measures. This highlights
the importance of using a performance measure that takes the social vulnerability of road users into consideration when
identifying the criticality of a road network and planning for fortification of links to avoid irreversible consequences for
vulnerable population groups. Furthermore, decision-making that considers the risks to different communities may lead
to a more effective distribution of resources and help support a timely and safe evacuation from disaster events by
strengthening the preservation of critical infrastructure links.
17. Key Words
Hurricane Evacuation, Critical links, Vulnerability,
Performance Measure, Natural Disaster

19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassified
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)

18. Distribution Statement
No restrictions. This document is available through the
National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA
22161.

20. Security Classif. (of this page)
21. No. of Pages
22. Price
Unclassified
57
Reproduction of completed page authorized.

ii

SI* (MODERN METRIC) CONVERSION FACTORS
APPROXIMATE CONVERSIONS TO SI UNITS
Symbol

When You Know

in
ft
yd
mi

inches
feet
yards
miles

Multiply By
LENGTH
25.4
0.305
0.914
1.61

To Find

Symbol

millimeters
meters
meters
kilometers

mm
m
m
km

square millimeters
square meters
square meters
hectares
square kilometers

mm
2
m
2
m
ha
2
km

AREA
2

in
2
ft
2
yd
ac
2
mi

square inches
square feet
square yard
acres
square miles

645.2
0.093
0.836
0.405
2.59

fl oz
gal
3
ft
3
yd

fluid ounces
gallons
cubic feet
cubic yards

oz
lb
T

ounces
pounds
short tons (2000 lb)

o

Fahrenheit

fc
fl

foot-candles
foot-Lamberts

lbf
2
lbf/in

poundforce
poundforce per square inch

Symbol

When You Know

mm
m
m
km

millimeters
meters
meters
kilometers

2

VOLUME
29.57
milliliters
3.785
liters
0.028
cubic meters
0.765
cubic meters
NOTE: volumes greater than 1000 L shall be shown in m3

mL
L
3
m
3
m

MASS
28.35
0.454
0.907

grams
kilograms
megagrams (or "metric ton")

g
kg
Mg (or "t")

TEMPERATURE (exact degrees)
F

5 (F-32)/9
or (F-32)/1.8

Celsius

o

lux
candela/m2

lx
cd/m2

C

ILLUMINATION
10.76
3.426

FORCE and PRESSURE or STRESS
4.45
6.89

newtons
kilopascals

N
kPa

APPROXIMATE CONVERSIONS FROM SI UNITS
Multiply By
LENGTH
0.039
3.28
1.09
0.621

To Find

Symbol

inches
feet
yards
miles

in
ft
yd
mi

square inches
square feet
square yards
acres
square miles

in
2
ft
2
yd
ac
2
mi

fluid ounces
gallons
cubic feet
cubic yards

fl oz
gal
3
ft
3
yd

ounces
pounds
short tons (2000 lb)

oz
lb
T

AREA
2

mm
2
m
2
m
ha
2
km

square millimeters
square meters
square meters
hectares
square kilometers

0.0016
10.764
1.195
2.47
0.386

mL
L
3
m
3
m

milliliters
liters
cubic meters
cubic meters

g
kg
Mg (or "t")

grams
kilograms
megagrams (or "metric ton")

o

Celsius

2

VOLUME
0.034
0.264
35.314
1.307

MASS
0.035
2.202
1.103

TEMPERATURE (exact degrees)
C

1.8C+32

Fahrenheit

o

foot-candles
foot-Lamberts

fc
fl

F

ILLUMINATION
lx
2
cd/m

lux
2
candela/m

N
kPa

newtons
kilopascals

0.0929
0.2919

FORCE and PRESSURE or STRESS
0.225
0.145

poundforce
poundforce per square inch

lbf
2
lbf/in

*SI is the symbol for the International System of Units. Appropriate rounding should be made to comply with Section 4 of ASTM E380.
(Revised March 2003)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION PAGE .................................................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND SYMBOLS ................................................................. x
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... xi
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
2. OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................. 5
3. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 6
4. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 11
4.1. Critical Zone Identification Using Three Vulnerability Criteria ....................................... 11
4.2. Four-Step Travel Demand Model ...................................................................................... 12
4.2.1. Trip generation ........................................................................................................... 12
4.2.2. Trip distribution .......................................................................................................... 13
4.2.3. Modal split .................................................................................................................. 14
4.2.4. Traffic assignment ....................................................................................................... 14
4.3. Identifying Critical Links ................................................................................................... 14
5. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING .......................................................................... 16
6. RESULTS ................................................................................................................................. 25
6.1. Critical Zone Identification ................................................................................................ 25
6.2. Trip Generation and Distribution ....................................................................................... 26
6.3. Trip Assignment ................................................................................................................ 26
6.4. Critical Links ..................................................................................................................... 27
6.5. Interactive GIS Map........................................................................................................... 31
7. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 32
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 34
APPENDIX A. CRITICAL LINKS IDENTIFIED BY DIFFERENT USER-BASED
CRITICALITY MEASURES ....................................................................................................... 40

iv

APPENDIX B. MOST CRITICAL LINKS IDENTIFIED BY DIFFERENT USER-BASED AND
LINK-BASED CRITICALITY MEASURES .............................................................................. 49

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Hurricane and Tropical Storm paths (1980-2017) (Source: weather.org). ...................... 2
Figure 2. Roads closures after Hurricane Harvey in 2017. ............................................................. 2
Figure 3. Performance metrics measuring network vulnerability classified in four major categories
.................................................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 4. Hurricane evacuation study area. .................................................................................. 17
Figure 5. Boundaries for the location of hurricane evacuation destinations................................. 17
Figure 6. Distribution of Social Vulnerability Index in the study area. ........................................ 18
Figure 7. Distribution of property value in the study area. ........................................................... 18
Figure 8. FEMA 100-year flood zones in the study area. ............................................................. 20
Figure 9. Distribution of percent of the census tract with high flood risk in the study area. ........ 21
Figure 10. Storm surge hazard map for a category 4 hurricane for Texas to Maine region. ........ 22
Figure 11. High water marks and flooded locations during and after Hurricane Harvey. ............ 23
Figure 12. Road network from in the area between evacuation origins and destinations. ........... 24
Figure 13. Critical zones in six risk areas. .................................................................................... 25
Figure 14. (a) Traversed edges by all OD trips (b) An example of a link disruption output. ....... 27
Figure 15. Most critical links identified by: (a) user-based measures; (b) link-based measures. . 29
Figure 16. Critical Links Selected by Vulnerability Criteria (a-e) and Network System (f). ....... 30
Figure A.1. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 1. ................................ 40
Figure A.2. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 1. ....................... 40
Figure A.3. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 1. .................. 41
Figure A.4. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 2. ................................ 41
Figure A.5. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 2. ....................... 42
Figure A.6. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 2. .................. 42
Figure A.7. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 3. ................................ 43
Figure A.8. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 3. ....................... 43
Figure A.9. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 3. .................. 44
Figure A.10. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 4. .............................. 44
Figure A.11. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 4. ..................... 45
Figure A.12. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 4. ................ 45
vi

Figure A.13. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 5S. ............................ 46
Figure A.14. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 5S. ................... 46
Figure A.15. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 5S. .............. 47
Figure A.16. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 5N. ........................... 47
Figure A.17. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 5N. .................. 48
Figure A.18. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 5N. ............. 48
Figure B.1. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by average SVI.... 49
Figure B.2. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by average economic
vulnerability. ............................................................................................................................. 49
Figure B.3. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by average
environmental vulnerability. ..................................................................................................... 50
Figure B.4. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by change in travel
time. .......................................................................................................................................... 50
Figure B.5. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by link length. ..... 51
Figure B.6. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by link volume. ... 51
Figure B.7. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by average SVI.
.................................................................................................................................................. 52
Figure B.8. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by average
economic vulnerability. ............................................................................................................ 52
Figure B.9. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by average
environmental vulnerability. ..................................................................................................... 53
Figure B.10. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by change in
travel time. ................................................................................................................................ 53
Figure B.11. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by link length.
.................................................................................................................................................. 54
Figure B.12. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by link volume.
.................................................................................................................................................. 54
Figure B.13. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by average
SVI. ........................................................................................................................................... 55
Figure B.14. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by average
economic vulnerability. ............................................................................................................ 55
Figure B.15. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by average
environmental vulnerability. ..................................................................................................... 56

vii

Figure B.16. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by change
in travel time. ............................................................................................................................ 56
Figure B.17. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by link
length. ....................................................................................................................................... 57
Figure B.18. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by link
volume. ..................................................................................................................................... 57

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Performance measures used to determine the criticality of road links. .......................... 14
Table 2. Trip Generation and Distribution Results. ...................................................................... 26
Table 3. Total number of evacuation links by zone and criterion. ............................................... 27
Table 4. Percentage of links selected by different performance measures. .................................. 28

ix

1

ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND SYMBOLS

2

ATSDR

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

3

CDC

Centers for Disease Control

4

CT

Census Tracts

5

ECV

Economic Vulnerability

6

ENV

Environmental Vulnerability

7

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

8

FHWA

Federal Highway Administration

9

HDS

Hurricane Disruption Spatial Data

10

MEOW

Maximum Envelopes of Water

11

MOMs

Maximum of MEOWs

12

NHC

National Hurricane Center

13

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

14

OD

Origin-Destination

15

OSM

Open Street Map

16

SES

Socioeconomic Status

17

SLOSH

sea, lake, and overland surges from Hurricanes

18

SNAP

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

19

SOV

Social Vulnerability

20

SVI

Social Vulnerability Index

21

TxDOT

Texas Department of Transportation

22

USGS

United States Geological Survey

23

x

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2
3
4
5
6
7

In 2017, the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) closed over 530 disrupted road sections
in the Houston area during Hurricane Harvey. Ground transportation for evacuation, motor carriers
transporting humanitarian aid, and first responders entering the flooded areas had to be rerouted
or rescheduled due to the road closures. To repair the damaged road infrastructure, the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) allocated $25 million of federal funds to TxDOT for emergency
repair activities such as removing debris, inspecting bridges and replacing traffic lights.
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In general, network links that carry higher traffic volume and those that ensure connectivity to
isolated subnetworks represent critical links because disruptions on the links would impact more
vehicles with a greater magnitude of travel time increase from rerouting or rescheduling. However,
the individuals and communities that use the infrastructure determines the importance of the road
links for community resiliency during the response and recovery phases of extreme weather events
varies based on their economic stability and social networks. If a certain link serves at-risk
communities (i.e., lower income or older population) for evacuation or humanitarian aid, the link
should be considered as a critical link regardless of its total traffic volume. These links must be
resilient to save lives within the neighborhood and strengthen the region’s overall resiliency.
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The proposed research identifies the criticality of network links by identifying the community
impacts from network disruption. In particular, this study focuses on developing a network index
to determine the critical network links of the communities in a Hurricane-prone area. The outcome
of this study will answer the following important questions for disaster planning, management,
and recovery.
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•
Which road links should be given a higher priority for disaster restoration during the
response and recovery phases of extreme weather events?
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Results show that the user-based and conventional link-based measures do not always result in
capturing the same critical links and the study demonstrates the differences between these two sets
of measures. In fact, the critical links used by vulnerable users do not necessarily result in a
significant impact on the general evacuee’s throughput due to the geographical locations of the
vulnerable populations. The study also highlights how the critical links for the vulnerable
population may differ based on the vulnerability types defined in this study.

31
32
33
34
35
36

This study provides a useful comparison framework among different vulnerability and criticality
measures so that decision makers can determine the critical links to prioritize retrofitting and
protection strategies for evacuation. This helps to not only find the criticality of links based on
their impacts on travel time and the number of evacuees they serve but also consider the
variations caused by differences in the demographic, economic and land use characteristics of
risk zones.

What are the impacts of network disruptions on communities?
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hurricanes and severe tropical storms are major disruptive events that have struck coastal cities
with higher frequency and intensity during the past few decades and caused considerable local and
global consequences. Research results on global warming and hurricanes by National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) geophysical fluid dynamics laboratory indicate that
tropical cyclone intensities and rainfall rates will increase in the future and the proportion of
tropical cyclones that reach intense (Category 4 and 5) levels will likely increase due to
anthropogenic warming over the 21st century (1). Tracking the adverse weather events in the past
few years after hurricane Harvey year indicate an increased number of named storms and
hurricanes from 17 named storms and 10 hurricanes in 2017 to 23 named storms and 10 hurricanes
in 2020. Since 2015, the Atlantic hurricane season may be growing because a named storm formed
before the official start of the hurricane season on June 1. Figure 1 shows the paths of hurricane
and tropical storms from 1980 to 2017.
The National Hurricane Center issues regular tropical weather outlooks during the hurricane
Atlantic season, which generally lasts from June to November; tropical storms turn to major
hurricanes (category 3 or greater) especially during a 2-month period after mid-August. Coastal
cities that lack preventive strategies may fail to protect critical transportation infrastructure and
face consecutive road disruptions. Preparation and regular evaluation of transportation network
vulnerability and resilience can help reduce the impacts of the network disruptions. Furthermore,
highway and bridge operations and resiliency represent one of the largest investments in Texas,
the region, and the US. State and national agencies should ensure the sustainable operation of the
transportation system during natural disasters for all residents, but the consequences for
particularly at-risk communities including older adults, people with disabilities, and people with
low income may require greater emphasis.
During the last major hurricane event in the Houston area in 2017, the Texas Department of
Transportation (TxDOT) closed over 530 disrupted road sections. Ground transportation for
evacuation, motor carriers transporting humanitarian aid, and first responders entering the flooded
areas had to be rerouted or rescheduled due to the road closures. For some of the roads, the closure
was prolonged, and many remained flooded or closed due to storm damage. Even the links that
were dry a few days after the hurricane had to be inspected for possible damage before they
reopened. According to officials, while the interstate highways were open soon, more than 100
other roadways remained closed and even in some cases, the roads remained closed for several
weeks because of high floodwaters and ongoing releases of water from reservoirs into overflowing
rivers and bayous. Furthermore, many of the infrastructures such as traffic signals were disrupted
and not functional for weeks. To repair the damaged road infrastructure, the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) allocated $25 million of federal funds to TxDOT for emergency repair
activities such as removing debris, inspecting bridges and replacing traffic lights. Figure 2 shows
samples of road closure and flooding after Hurricane Harvey.
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Figure 1. Hurricane and Tropical Storm paths (1980-2017) (Source: weather.org).

Figure 2. Roads closures after Hurricane Harvey in 2017.

2

Increased risk of severe weather events, especially in coastal cities, raises the frequency of
government-issued evacuation orders or optional evacuation by a proportion of population. This
highlights the importance of studies on optimization of evacuation, understanding evacuation
behavior, and evacuation timing (2–4). The efficiency of different strategies to facilitate and
improve the evacuation outcomes, such as contraflow, has also been investigated in evacuation
research (5,6). The transportation network represents the most crucial infrastructure component of
evacuation and in order to have an effective and timely evacuation, different transportation
constituents must function properly. This motivates researchers to explore the vulnerability and
resilience of various transportation infrastructures during different stages before and after natural
disasters (7,8). Models developed based on real evacuation behavior obtained by surveys in areas
affected by major hurricanes provide a foundation for evaluating the performance of strategies and
infrastructure during evacuation and afterwards.
In general, network links that carry higher traffic volumes and those that ensure connectivity to
isolated subnetworks represent critical links for evacuation because disruptions on the links would
impact more vehicles with a greater magnitude of travel time increase from rerouting or
rescheduling. However, the individuals and communities that use the infrastructure may also
determine the importance of the road links because community resiliency during the evacuation
phases of extreme weather events vary based on their social and economic stability. If a certain
link serves at-risk communities (i.e., lower income or older population) for evacuation, the link
should be considered as a critical link regardless of its total traffic volume. These links must be
resilient to save lives within the neighborhood and strengthen the region’s overall resiliency. This
mainly occurs because a lack of transportation options for evacuation and food supply will
significantly affect their survival during the extreme weather event. The geography of Texas
presents particularly significant risks for these vulnerable populations along the Gulf coast.
Although achieving community resiliency remains a priority of the region, scant research has been
conducted to develop strategies that minimize societal impacts along with enhancing infrastructure
reliability.
The importance of this research draws attention to the mobility challenges of vulnerable
populations. Another issue is the limited resources available for these vulnerable groups including
lack of financial resources, knowledge, education and technology; all of these affect evacuation
during hurricane disasters. Furthermore, highly vulnerable and isolated communities encounter
higher threats during different phases of disasters, mostly because of their inability to evacuate,
significant damages from disaster effects such as flooding, and a lack of access to disaster relief
measures.
The study identifies the criticality of zones (i.e., communities) and evacuation network links that
serve the zones by identifying the vulnerability of communities and their impacts from network
disruption. In particular, this study focuses on developing network criticality measures to
determine the important evacuation network links in a Hurricane-prone area based on
communities’ social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities. The traditional four-step
evacuation demand modeling will capture the regional evacuation behaviors and evacuation
network loading. Overall, the outcome of this study will answer the following important questions
for disaster planning and management.
• What are the impacts of network disruptions on communities based on the evacuation
behavioral and spatial distributions?
3

• Which road links should be given a higher priority for disaster preparation to support timely
and safe evacuation for vulnerable communities?
The strategic plans obtained from the study will maximize the efficiency of disaster evacuation
while considering the equity and need of communities with varying degrees of resilience and
vulnerability. Decision-making that considers the risks to different communities may lead to a
more effective distribution of resources and lead to a timely and safe evacuation from disaster
events by strengthening the preservation of critical infrastructure links. The findings will strongly
support short- and long-term transportation and infrastructure planning for policy makers and
planners especially when optimizing maintenance and operation resources for future strategies
while considering budget and time constraints to achieve maximum efficiency in disaster
preparation.
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2. OBJECTIVES
As one of the principal lifeline systems, transportation networks deliver essential resources and
services during the response and recovery phases of extreme weather events and must remain intact
to enhance regional resiliency. Since Hurricane Harvey in 2017, agencies and elected officials
have placed an increasing emphasis on preserving regional infrastructure by prioritizing
investments on transportation network infrastructure and operations to promote a fast and
sustainable recovery and enhance community resiliency. The project directly addresses the
regional focus of preserving and enhancing transportation infrastructure resiliency by
understanding the current transportation network and identifying the most critical and impactful
network links. The project evaluates network resiliency with an understanding of not only the
transportation infrastructure system itself but also risks (consequences) associated with the system
failure. Developing a strategy that prioritizes infrastructure resiliency investments based on the
social and economic risks represents a critical strategy for maximizing the effectiveness of
resiliency investments.
Maintaining the transportation network system remains critical for disaster relief activities and
emergency responders during the response and recovery periods. The proposed research will
enhance the resiliency of the transportation infrastructure in the event of extreme weather events
because it focuses on the acute resiliency and risks associated with extreme weather events like
Gulf of Mexico-based tropical storms. Given the size and scope of disaster events, the resources
for road repair and restoration need to be strategically allocated during the response and recovery
phases. Historically, stakeholders prioritize transportation network links that carry higher demand
(volume) to minimize total system costs. However, this study emphasizes the need and
vulnerability of the actual users of the infrastructure and their recovery from the event because the
transportation network must serve these users during and after the disaster event for their survival
and recovery.
This study seeks to develop a framework to evaluate road network infrastructure criticality during
extreme weather events by considering the user characteristics of the transportation network. The
team evaluates the risk and vulnerability of road network components and quantifies the impact
on the primary road users’ mobility and access during the evacuation phase of an extreme weather
event. The study uses three criteria for network infrastructure criticality: if transportation links
provide (i) access to evacuation routes and safe locations for socially vulnerable population who
are at higher risk of long impacts in post-disaster period (Social Vulnerability) (ii) access to the
residents of zones which will inflict significant economic losses if not properly evacuated or do
not receive disaster relief measures during and after disasters (Economic Vulnerability), and (iii)
mobility for populations and communities who are at considerably higher risk of getting impacted
by disaster consequences such as flooding (Environmental Vulnerability).
This project meticulously reviews the literature on hurricane evacuation behavior to understand
important factors that affect the evacuation decisions by households in different risk zones. It
examines models and survey results based on real evacuation behavior data or stated preferences
for population with various demographic and socioeconomic characteristics so that the study
methodology and results reflect the most probable conditions as much as possible. The study
incorporates valid models and parameters obtained from existing hurricane evacuation research,
specifically those determined for hurricane experiences in Texas coastal areas. Such an approach
estimates the traffic link data with more realistic and practical assumptions.
5

3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Evacuation demands and predictions
Establishing strategies and policies that maximize the efficiency of responses before, during and
after hurricanes requires understanding evacuation behavior. An extensive body of research aims
at identifying factors that potentially impact household evacuation decisions (9–11). The
evacuation behavior for hurricanes differs from other types of emergency evacuation because
numerous variables influence not only the decision to evacuate but also the modality and timing
of evacuation. These variables range from risk perception (12), information sources and their
reliability (13,14), social cohesion (15) and many demographic and social factors (16–19). The
studies on this topic target the residents of hurricane-prone zones to investigate the role that
different factors play in the household evacuation decision or to determine factors influencing the
hurricane evacuation order compliance rate. Most of the research relies on survey results to model
the evacuation behavior and decision. The models seek to predict the future behavior using
observed behavior of respondents in after-event studies, and investigate hypothetical scenarios
using respondents’ stated preferences (20). The model findings in previous studies do not agree
over a strong association between socioeconomic and demographic characteristics because of the
uncertainties and complexities involved in hurricane evacuation decisions. However, several
variables like age and presence of children in a household (19,21); storm intensity and housing
condition (18,22); gender, perceived storm characteristics, official warnings, hurricane experience,
and house ownership status (9,23–25); race and education level (25,26) exhibit important
relationships with actual evacuation behavior.
The literature also investigates the issues related to hurricane evacuation and behavioral responses
during different phases of pre- and post-disaster. Many of the studies examine how people respond
to warning messages, and their various precautionary actions when dealing with potentially
dangerous weather events. Understanding who evacuates and who does not evacuate has been a
cornerstone of research in the area of disaster mitigation. The characteristics of warning messages
represent an important part of this field. For example, research indicates that more specific
warnings make people more likely to adopt adaptive responses, and if warnings are believed, then
evacuation would be initiated (27). Other research aims at understanding how warning
characteristics can trigger evacuation. Mileti and O’Brien (28) discuss that public responses to risk
information depend on how they perceive the risk and how warning messages are constructed in
terms of their clarity, accuracy, consistency, and frequency, and the personal characteristics of the
person who receives the warning.
To better understand how people respond to disasters, a protective action decision model (PADM)
has been used to examine the impacts of several decision-making factors including environmental
cues and social information about a hazard as well as previous experience on perceived risk (29).
Lindell and Hwang (30) extend the model to consider the effects of environmental proximity and
personal experience, in addition to confirming the crucial role of perceived risk. The perceived
risk represents an important factor that can significantly alter the households’ decisions and how
they react when facing a natural hazard. Lindell and Hwang (30) emphasize the effect of disaster
experience, gender, income, and hazard proximity on the perceived risk. The perceived risk
remains especially critical to impact evacuation behavior, facilitate and optimize evacuation, and
develop disaster relief strategies. These study outcomes show that the interactions among warning,
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risk perception, and evacuation are determinative in understanding the evacuation decision
making.
As more data about individual decisions on disaster responses have become available, researchers
have tried to develop models to investigate the actual and expected behaviors. Besides, a number
of surveys that have been conducted right after hurricanes provide generalized factors and
variations in decisions among individuals during the threats of disasters. Baker (31) uses data and
suggests five major variables that account for variation in decisions including:
-

Risk level in the impacted area
Actions adopted by authorities
Housing conditions of the residents
Previous personal risk perception
Threat factors associated with the storm

As discussed earlier, inconsistencies appear in previous research around the significance of
independent variables in predicting the evacuation decision. Using Hurricane Bonnie’s household
data in North Carolina, Whitehead et al. (18) assesses the role of storm intensity on evacuation
behavior, and more specifically, destination patterns. They determine that a household’s perceived
risk of flooding rather than the perceived risk of wind primarily influences their evacuation
decisions. The likelihood of evacuation for those who live in mobile homes appears higher than
other groups. Their results also confirm that non-white households and those with higher levels of
education seem more likely to evacuate to family or friends’ homes.
The evacuation decisions directly impact the travel demand and network loading during the
evacuation periods. Fu and Wilmot (32) discuss that the evacuation decision should be considered
as a series of binary choices over time to estimate the probability of households’ evacuation in
different time periods based on their socioeconomic characteristics, intensity of hurricane and
authority decisions before the hurricane landfall. In order to understand the reliance on different
information sources, Lindell et al. (33) examine five hypotheses supported by previous hurricane
evacuation research using the evacuation data from Hurricane Lili. These hypotheses included:
-

-

Residents of risk zones rely on some information sources more than other sources; they
trust local news media the most and the Internet the least.
Residents of risk zones are more concerned about some information types than others;
environmental cues concern them the most and evacuation impediments concern them the
least.
Coastal proximity, housing structure type, information sources, and evacuation difficulties
predict evacuation decisions during hurricane events.
The same variables mentioned as predictors of evacuation decisions, as well as time of day
predict the timing of the hurricane evacuation decisions.
The preparation time for evacuation is defined by the time it takes to prepare and travel
from work to home, gather all family members, pack required items, to carry out property
protection measures and reach the evacuation routes and this time ranges from 60 to 450
minutes.

Testing these hypotheses confirmed the previous findings about information courses, concerns and
evacuation decision timings and showed that households’ characteristics and evacuation decision
and preparation time are not correlated.
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An evacuee’s destination played a major role in determining evacuation plans and the distribution
of network loadings. Several studies investigate the significant variables influencing the
determination of destination during an evacuation and developed models using observed behavior
data. Mesa-Arango et al. (34) used a nested logit model considering houses of friends and relatives,
hotels, public shelters, and churches as discrete destination choices and found the impact of factors
such as hurricane position at evacuation time, household location, race, income, and evacuation
notices on this decision. Sadri et al. (35) also employed a nested logit model to explain the
destination choice behavior of Miami Beach residents in a hypothetical hurricane focusing on the
needs of transit users. Jiang et al. (36) investigated the association between social factors (i.e.,
social distance) and evacuation destination choice using an integrated gravity model. Cheng et al.
(37) investigated the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of destinations on destination
choice behavior using a multinomial logit model using two alternatives of relatives or friends’
houses and hotels. Other studies proposed various models including the intervening opportunity
model (38,39), agent-based model (40), and spatially correlated logit model (41). Cheng et al. (42)
used a static gravity model for an estimation of dynamic OD matrices using a combined impedance
function followed by a calibration using a dynamic gravity model. The destination choice model
directly impacted the route choice models because the sparse rural networks often required
significant travel time increases when drivers were forced to alternate routes.
Route choice represents another important decision that directly influences the identification of
critical links during evacuation. Evacuees often prefer to take familiar routes or follow the
evacuation routes recommended by officials. Sadri et al. (43) use household survey results after
Hurricane Ivan in Alabama and evaluate the combined effect of different variables on evacuation
route choice behavior using a mixed logit model. Their study shows that the majority of evacuees
use the routes they consider as the shortest path rather than the recommended routes. Robinson
and Khattak (44) investigate the effectiveness of advanced traveler information systems in route
choice decisions by evacuees during hurricane evacuations. A study on hurricane evacuation
logistics during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita shows that the evacuees mostly rely on their previous
routing experience (45). Lindell et al. (46) evaluate the responses of evacuees during Hurricane
Lili and determine that familiarity with the roads and evacuee’s expectations about the evacuation
time, safety and convenience appear the major contributors of route choices . Other studies show
that the evacuation route choice significantly depends on previous experiences and the policies
adopted by officials such as contraflow and information systems (47,48).
Performance Metrics to evaluate Network Criticality
The abovementioned evacuation decision making elements directly impact the susceptibility,
vulnerability, and criticality of road segments. The literature extensively investigates road network
vulnerability using indices such as change in travel cost (49), traffic volume (50), flow (51),
accessibility (49,52), network efficiency measure (53), importance (54), and robustness index (55).
Hurricane and natural disaster evacuation research only measures the vulnerability of the road
network in terms of accessibility, clearance time, and connectivity (56–59). A few studies
investigate the criticality of road links for evacuation purposes. Helderop and Grubesic (60) assess
the road network criticality during flood evacuation using a modified grid-based centrality measure
as a “high-fidelity” alternative for traditional centrality measures. Sullivan et al. (61) propose a
methodology to rank the most critical links for short-term disruptive events using a link-based
capacity disruption approach. Stamos et al. (62) develop a framework for criticality assessment in
evacuation using a travel time minimization approach. All of these studies focus on physical
8

characteristics of the infrastructure and try to investigate topological measures such as connectivity
and accessibility of the network.
Vulnerability of transportation infrastructure has been quantitatively assessed, especially after
natural and man-made disasters in the last few decades. However, the operational measures used
to evaluate vulnerability or reliability depend on the context and the definition provided by the
research. Some of these definitions include sensitivity to threats (63), susceptibility for big risks
(64), “the non-operability of the network under certain circumstances” (65), and “society’s risk of
transport system disruptions and degradations” (66). The criticality of a link or node in the road
network is often associated with the probability of that component failing and the resulting
consequence for the whole system (54). This means that if the occurrence of an indicant is high
and a link or node is weak and results in considerable consequences if disrupted or lost, they are
considered critical. The consequences are mostly measures using traditional metrics such as
change in travel cost.
Other recent studies assess the vulnerability of different communities during evacuation and the
role their socioeconomic characteristics play in the impact of a disruptive event. Cutter et al. (67)
assess the spatial vulnerability of people and places using biophysical and social vulnerability
measures and show that these two measures do not lead to identifying the same vulnerable
locations. Chakraborty et al. (68) use a geophysical risk index and social vulnerability index to
understand the spatial patterns of evacuation assistance needs and find that each index can result
in a different pattern.
Overall, summarizing the research in this field reveals that the performance measures used to
assess the vulnerability of the road network during evacuation and post-disaster phases fall into
four major categories related to link, node, flow, and threats. Figure 3 shows an example of some
of the measures associated with each of these categories. Obviously, some of the metrics can be
indirectly related to another category depending on how they are used to measure the vulnerability,
resilience or criticality of a network or a series of links.

Figure 3. Performance metrics measuring network vulnerability classified in four major categories
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The results of these studies indicate the crucial importance of taking the population or road users
into consideration during hurricane evacuation analysis. Yet, despite the observed importance, a
gap in the assessment of road user vulnerabilities and related indicators for identification of critical
links in the road network during evacuation remains. This study aims at filling the existing gap by
incorporating the effects of considering the socially, economically, and environmentally
vulnerable communities in measuring and identifying the most critical links during hurricane
evacuation.
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4. METHODOLOGY
This study develops a multi-tiered framework to integrate various models and performance metrics
to identify critical zones and evacuation links. The following sections present the details of each
method and approach used in the framework.

4.1. Critical Zone Identification Using Three Vulnerability Criteria
The first step in the framework identifies the more vulnerable zones that appear critical for decision
makers to facilitate evacuation during an emergency. This study develops three different criteria
to evaluate the criticality of zones based on their unique and distinct vulnerability to a hurricane
event.
The first criterion indicates users’ social vulnerability to determine critical zones. The Social
Vulnerability Index (SVI) developed by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) is a comprehensive
indicator of a community’s resilience to assess community response during different phases of a
disaster. This index ranks the census tracts (CTs) on 15 social factors based on socioeconomic
status, household composition and disability, minority status and language, and housing type and
transportation (69). The socially vulnerable areas based on the SVI index represent at-risk
communities that a hurricane may disproportionately affect due to a lack of essential resources to
withstand a disaster event. Their safe and fast evacuation means saving more lives; therefore, the
transportation network that serves socially vulnerable communities must be prioritized.
The second criterion provides a measure of environmental vulnerability. This criterion determines
locations with a higher danger of flooding during a hurricane based on the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) 100-year floodplain map, which defines varying levels of flood risk
and more vulnerable areas. Residents who live close to stream channels and floodplains bear higher
vulnerability as their impact and damages could be more likely and intense. Therefore, residents
living in these flooding-prone areas have a greater need to evacuate, and the transportation network
must ensure their access to evacuation routes.
The third criterion uses economic vulnerability from the decision-makers’ perspective to determine
critical zones. During an emergency, locations with higher economic values may need more
attention because their failed evacuation could lead to more considerable losses affecting the local
economy and political leverage, from the perspectives of politicians and decision-makers. A
property appraisal provides an estimation of the economic liability of a natural disaster on different
districts and households. The critical zones selected by property value conversely represent the
locations of greatest economic vulnerability from the decision maker’s standpoint. This index also
appears important since it may identify different locations from the other two criteria due to the
nature of the vulnerable assessment standpoint, which provides more inclusive and comprehensive
research outcomes and critical links for decision-makers.
If considered together, these criteria represent a sustainable approach to hurricane preparedness
that emphasizes the most vulnerable community along the three sustainability areas of economic,
social, and environmental well-being. This paper represents an initial effort to distinguish the
differences in priorities that may arise from over reliance on one of the sustainability thrusts and
the benefits of trying to consider all of the sustainability components.
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4.2. Four-Step Travel Demand Model
In the framework, the four-step demand model provides an estimation of the number of evacuating
vehicles in different risk zones, the destination choices of households, and routes selected to reach
their destination. Evacuation behaviors inherently involve uncertainties especially during an
emergency since the risk perception of individuals and households change based on the level and
type of the disaster event. However, the evacuation prediction results must determine critical
network links with stability because these important links should always be prioritized to support
evacuation activities. This study assumes a ‘worst-case’ scenario where all of the households in a
flooding impact area evacuate with a very short lead time after an evacuation order. This
assumption allows the vehicle loading on each network to reach at maximum, which warrants a
less sensitive prioritization depending on the evacuation demand estimations.

4.2.1. Trip generation
The trip generation step estimates the number of vehicles evacuating from different zones impacted
by the disaster using household characteristics such as household size and number of available
vehicles. Previous studies use various models including a fixed evacuation rate (70), logistic
regression (71) or advanced machine-learning neural network models (71) to estimate trips
generated for evacuation. They typically use resident household trips as an evacuation unit since
trips of non-residents or transient populations are negligible during an evacuation. This study
adopts a well-known study by Lindell and Prater (72) with the following model to estimate the
number of evacuating vehicles based on hurricane category:
𝑃

𝑧𝑠
𝐸𝑉𝑧𝑠𝑐 = (𝑃𝐻𝐻
) 𝐷𝑧𝑐 (1 − 𝑇𝐷)(𝐸𝑉𝐻𝐻 + 𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐻)(1 − 𝑆)𝑈𝑧𝑠

(1)

Where 𝐸𝑉𝑧𝑠𝑐 = the number of evacuating vehicles from Sector s of Risk Zone z during Hurricane
Category c;
𝑃𝑧𝑠 = population of Sector s in Risk Zone z;
𝑃𝐻𝐻 = number of persons per household;
𝐷𝑧𝑐 = the proportion of households in Risk Zone z deciding to evacuate in Hurricane Category c;
𝑇𝐷= proportion of transit dependent households;
𝐸𝑉𝐻𝐻 = average number of evacuating vehicles for each household;
𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐻 = average number of evacuating trailers for each household;
𝑆 = the proportion of early evacuees;
𝑈𝑧𝑠 = the proportion of households in Sector s of Risk Zone z who use the primary evacuation
routes.
The location of a residence (e.g., risk zones) and intensity of a hurricane represent the most
important decision factors impacting the evacuation decision. Lindell and Prater (72) use these two
determinants to regress the evacuation rate based on a storm category and smooth out the rates
using linear and quadratic terms. The risk areas range from 1 to 5 (1 being the highest risk) and
increases as the hurricane category rises. The study adopts this approach and defines the coastal
zone as risk area 1 and the central and north areas of Harris County as risk area 5. The authors
divide the central and northern parts of Harris County into the 5S and 5N zones and compute the
rate for the northern part using interpolation. Thus, the evacuation rate for zones 1 to 6 represent
98.2% 88.2%, 83.4%, 80.5%, 78.8%, and 75%, respectively.
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Those who rely on transit for evacuation include the disabled and older adults as well as individuals
with low socioeconomic status (SES) ((73), (74)). Many studies estimate the transit dependent
population by applying a fixed ratio for all the study areas with an assumption of a fixed proportion
of transit dependent population across the region; however, this method can result in significant
bias in the areas with higher or lower SES. Therefore, this study uses the percentage of the
population who are disabled and received Food Stamps/SNAP in the past 12 months as a proxy
for transit dependence. This measure represents the population who commonly lack financial
resources and highly correlate to vehicle ownership.
Finally, in order to simulate the worst-case scenario, the study sets the proportion of early evacuees
at zero. By applying these ratios and assumptions in equation 1, the authors estimate the trips
generated in each census tract.

4.2.2. Trip distribution
The destination choice by the evacuees appears to be difficult to formulate as it is highly dependent
on personal preferences. However, previous studies reveal that most evacuees prefer the homes of
friends/relatives and hotels in safe areas (34), which provides a logical foundation for an
assumption that urban areas attract more population. Using a gravity model, which determines the
patterns of trips from origins based on the relative attractiveness of destinations and the difficulties
of making trips to destinations, this study distributes the evacuating vehicles from origins in the
risk zones to destinations in safe zones particularly urban areas. A production-constrained gravity
model estimates the number of trips from each origin zone to destination zones using the following
equation:
𝐴𝑗 𝛾𝑖𝑗

𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖 ∑𝑁

(2)

𝑗=1 𝐴𝑗 𝛾𝑖𝑗

Where:
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = the number of trips produced in zone i and attracted to zone j
𝑃𝑖 = the total number of trips produced in zone i,
𝐴𝑖 = the total number of trips attracted to zone j,
𝛾𝑖𝑗 = impedance of travel between zones i and j,
𝑁 = total number of destination zones.
Impedance measures the trip difficulty. Evacuees tend to travel to places not threatened by
hurricane impacts; however, the number of trips to a specific destination is inversely proportional
to the length of trip since the evacuation is an involuntary trip. To accommodate these two terms,
Cheng et al. (42) used two widely accepted functions including negative exponential and Rayleigh
function as shown by equations 3 and 4, respectively.
𝑓(𝑐𝑖𝑗 ) = 𝑒 −𝛼𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑓(𝑑𝑗 ) =

𝑑𝑗

𝑒
𝛽2

(3)
𝑑𝑗

−0.5( )2
𝛽

(4)

Where, 𝑐𝑖𝑗 is the travel cost, 𝑑𝑗 is distance between risk zone and destination, and α and β are
parameters. The parameters can be estimated based on real hurricane evacuation behavior data.
Using OD data from evacuation during Hurricane Floyd, a category 4 Hurricane, Cheng et al (42)
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estimated α and β through a chi-square minimization process. The study uses their estimated value
of α=0.006 and β=1.9 for the static gravity model.

4.2.3. Modal split
Public transit serves households for local evacuation (e.g., those who evacuate to local shelter).
This study does not include trips to local shelters; therefore, it assumes 100 percent auto-trips in
the modal choice step as a worst-case loading.

4.2.4. Traffic assignment
Traffic assignment during evacuation is a complex process affected by various factors such as
drivers’ acquaintance with routes, management of evacuation routes, and preference of drivers to
use the shortest path or familiar roads. The majority of evacuees tend to be more familiar with and
feel safe on major roads and interstate highways (75), which federal and state agencies also
designate as evacuation routes. During an emergency, evacuees do not detour unless a shortest
path is not available due to flooding or incidents. This study uses evacuation routes consisting of
major arterials and interstate highways as a baseline network and applies the shortest path
algorithm to estimate route choices.
The study uses critical zones selected based on the vulnerability criteria as the origin of evacuation.
The shortest path analysis for vehicles travelling from evacuation zones to destinations determine
the links expected to be used during evacuation. In addition to the baseline network loading, this
study needs to estimate the impact of link disruptions to identify the critical links over the network.
To simulate a link disruption, the authors remove a link of the evacuation routes by creating a
barrier. If the study area includes too many links, they can be reduced by identifying the links more
likely to experience a disruption such as links disrupted or flooded during previous hurricanes.
After identifying a limited number of links for each set of evacuation ODs, the final link criticality
estimation uses a set of performance measures described in the following section.

4.3. Identifying Critical Links
A network link assesses its criticality based on a set of performance measures that capture the
impacts of a link disruption. While conventional measures focus on the traffic volumes or travel
times served by network links, this study develops new performance measures that take the
characteristics of the actual users into consideration, since different locations pose social,
environmental, and financial vulnerabilities for evacuation. Table 1 lists the conventional linkbased performance measures that estimate the impact of disruption by relying on V/C ratio or
changes in travel time from a disruption. However, the new user-based performance measures
identify the critical links by understanding the impact of disruption on the corresponding road
users. For example, the Social Vulnerability (SOV) measure indicates the average value of SVI
for the zones, therefore a link that has a high SOV value serves socially vulnerable communities.
On the other hand, Economic Vulnerability (ECV) shows the average property values of the zones
impacted by a link disruption. Therefore, a link that has a high ECV serves more affluent
communities with higher property values. Links with higher Environmental Vulnerability (ENV)
serve communities that have higher flooding impacts. Overall, these user-based measures integrate
the characteristics of the link users to understand where the disruption consequences occur.
Table 1. Performance measures used to determine the criticality of road links.
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Type
Conventional
Link Based
Measures

Performance measure

Definition

Length

The length of a link

Volume

The number of vehicles expected to use a link

Change in travel time

The increase in evacuation time due to a link disruption

Social Vulnerability (SOV)
New User
Based
Measures

Economic Vulnerability
(ECV)
Environmental
Vulnerability (ENV)

Average value of social vulnerability index of zones
expected to use the link during evacuation
Average value of appraisal values of zones expected to
use the link during evacuation
Average value of flood risk expected to use the link
during evacuation
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5. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING
This study requires extensive data on population, network, land value, and disruption-related maps
for critical zone and link development and travel demand modeling. The study area is limited to
the counties in the greater Houston area likely impacted by a major category 4 hurricane in Texas
and the residents would likely evacuate. The study area includes Harris, Galveston, Brazoria,
Chambers, Fort Bend, and Matagorda counties as shown in Figure 4.
The locations of safe zones or evacuation destinations were selected by evaluating the counties
within a reasonable distance from the hurricane impact area or areas that can potentially be
considered as an evacuation destination. The research team merged smaller and less populated
counties. The study uses 26 destination areas with the boundaries for these locations shown in
Figure 5. This figure shows the names of the highly populated counties. As shown, the northern
part of Harris County represents a destination zone since it is far from high-risk areas in coastal
zones. Jefferson County is not within the risk zone map used in this study. Since this county is
one of the most susceptible areas during a major hurricane event, it would be unsafe, or evacuees
and the study considers the number of trips to this county to be zero.
The socioeconomic and demographic data are obtained from the 2018 U.S. Census estimate. The
team obtains the Social Vulnerability Index data (SVI) from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention/ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (CDC/ATSDR) at the Census
Tract level as shown in Figure 6 (76). The study uses the road network from Open Street Map
(OSM). The network includes motorway, primary, and secondary roads with direction, speed, and
number of lanes data and covers the area from Dallas in the North, Austin and San Antonio to the
west, Corpus Christi to the south and the Texas boundary with Louisiana to the east.
As shown in Figure 7, the study obtains the parcel dataset from the Texas Natural Resources
Information System, which provides property information such as property owner, land use, value,
and location attributes (77). The data highlights the higher market value (including land value and
improvement value) of properties in the central areas of Houston and some parts of coastal areas
in Galveston County. The research team uses this dataset to estimate economic vulnerability
metrics.
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Figure 4. Hurricane evacuation study area.

Figure 5. Boundaries for the location of hurricane evacuation destinations.
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Figure 6. Distribution of Social Vulnerability Index in the study area.

Figure 7. Distribution of property value in the study area.
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The (FEMA) database published in 2018 provides the 100-year flood plain maps. According to
FEMA, this map can help to identify any place with at least a 1% chance of experiencing flood
during a year, and those areas have at least a one-in-four chance of flooding during a 30-year
mortgage. The flood zones designated in the map (Figure 8) are geographical areas that FEMA
defines based on varying levels of flood risk. These zones are depicted on a community’s flood
insurance rate map or flood hazard boundary map. Each zone in the map reflects the severity of
the type of flooding in the area. This study selects high risk areas to determine the flood risk in the
study area. These zones are labeled as A, AE, AH, AR, and VE zones and FEMA describes them
as follows:
Zone A: Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding and a 26% chance of flooding over the life
of a 30‐year mortgage.
Zone AE: The base floodplain where base flood elevations are provided.
Zone AH: Areas with a 1% annual chance of shallow flooding, usually in the form of a pond,
with an average depth ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These areas have a 26% chance of flooding over
the life of a 30‐year mortgage.
Zone AR: Areas with a temporarily increased flood risk due to the building or restoration of a
flood control system (such as a levee or a dam).
Zone VE: Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard
associated with storm waves.

The flood risk map is used to develop the environmental vulnerability measure by calculating the
proportion of each census tract with high flood risk and the results are shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 8. FEMA 100-year flood zones in the study area.
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Figure 9. Distribution of percent of the census tract with high flood risk in the study area.

In addition, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) and Central Pacific Hurricane Center database
provides the storm surge hazard map for different coastal zones including Texas to Maine (78).
Storm surge is defined as the abnormal rise of water generated by a storm, over and above the
predicted astronomical tides. Flooding from storm surge depends on many factors, such as the
track, intensity, size, and forward speed of the hurricane and the characteristics of the coastline
where it comes ashore or passes nearby. Storm surges from tropical cyclones are simulated by
utilizing the hydrodynamic sea, lake, and overland surges from the Hurricanes (SLOSH) model.
The NHC provides two products based on hypothetical hurricanes including Maximum Envelopes
of Water (MEOWs) and Maximum of MEOWs (MOMs). MEOWs are created by computing the
maximum storm surge resulting from up to 100,000 hypothetical storms simulated through each
SLOSH grid of varying forward speed, radius of maximum wind, intensity (Categories 1-5),
landfall location, tide level, and storm direction. MOMs are created for each storm category by
retaining the maximum storm surge value in each grid cell for all the MEOWs, regardless of the
forward speed, storm trajectory, or landfall location. The storm surge hazard map for category 4
hurricanes is used to calculate the distance between destinations and the hurricane-induced storm
surge. The storm surge map is shown in Figure 10.

21

Figure 10. Storm surge hazard map for a category 4 hurricane for Texas to Maine region.

The study uses the Hurricane Disruption Spatial Data (HDS) from the Hurricane Harvey Flood
Data Collections database to develop high risk network links. The HDS includes information on
flood depths, flood extents, high water marks, streamflow and damages recorded from national
agencies such as NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and Civil Air Patrol (79). This dataset can help to find
the locations which are more susceptible to flooding due to hurricanes. The probability of link
disruption of these locations could be higher due to their high water in a hurricane event. Figure
11 presents the location of previously impacted areas in hurricane Harvey.
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Figure 11. High water marks and flooded locations during and after Hurricane Harvey.

Finally, the road network dataset is extracted from OpenStreetMap which includes the direction of
travel, speed and number lanes. The team interpolates the missing data of speed and number of
lanes considering the type of road and the existing data for neighboring links. Figure 12 shows the
road network covering the area between evacuation origins and expected evacuation destinations
in Texas.
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Figure 12. Road network from in the area between evacuation origins and destinations.
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6. RESULTS
6.1. Critical Zone Identification
Figure 13 shows the most critical zones selected by the three vulnerability criteria for the risk areas
1 to 5S/N. Even though any number of Census Tracts (CTs) could represent the critical zones, this
study uses 17 CTs since they comprise the top quartile (25%) of the entire CTs for risk area 1.
Therefore, 102 zones (=17CTs * 6 Risk areas) are selected as the most critical zones for each
vulnerability criteria from each of the six risk areas. Expectedly, a proportion of these 102 zones
share two or three criteria, since socially vulnerable zones could also be environmentally
vulnerable as an example. Six zones are selected as the critical zones using all three vulnerability
criteria. This seems counterintuitive since social vulnerability and high property value (which
determines the economic vulnerability from the decision-maker’s standpoint) might not be
compatible, however SVI (that determines the social vulnerability) relies on a combination of
various social, demographic, and economic features. Therefore, a specific zone might be
characterized as socially vulnerable (based on non-economic variables such as age) but
economically high valued.

Figure 13. Critical zones in six risk areas.
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6.2. Trip Generation and Distribution
Table 2 shows the trips generated from all 1,004 CTs located in the six risk areas. The trip
generation model uses the given proportion of transit dependent population based on the
percentage of the population who are disabled and received Food Stamps/SNAP in the past 12
months. Risk zones 1 and 2 show a higher rate of transit dependent population and consequent risk
of isolation if evacuation transportation is not provided. The total number of evacuees, specifically
for Zones 5S and 5N are high due to their high population density near the city of Houston. The
gravity model calculates the destination choice for the evacuees and shows the highest proportion
of evacuees travelling to the Dallas region, which is the largest and most populated area with the
safest distance from the hurricane impact area.
Table 2. Trip Generation and Distribution Results.

Trip Generation
Risk
Area
Area
1
Area
2
Area
3
Area
4
Area
5S
Area
5N

Trip Distribution (vehicles)

% Transit
Dependent
Population

Total
Evacuating
Vehicles

Austin
Region

Dallas
Region

San
Antonio
Region

Bell
Region

Smith
Region

Other
Region

7.95

44,701

4,454

30,162

5,107

1,925

1,616

3,666

8.22

98,113

9,178

62,259

10,523

3,959

3,318

7,234

4.33

157,797

16,089

109,030

18,445

6,944

5,820

12,899

5.95

326,669

31,361

212,636

35,946

13,531

11,343

25,007

4.32

713,911

67,728

458,716

77,652

29,218

24,440

53,833

5.56

727,132

69,169

468,849

79,184

29,843

24,987

55,129

6.3. Trip Assignment
The shortest path algorithm in GIS for each set of ODs results in 442 routes from 17 origins to 26
destinations for six risk areas. Overall, this study obtains 1,155,883 links used by 102 socially
vulnerable zones, 1,203,139 links by economically vulnerable zones, and 1,170,907 links by
environmentally vulnerable zones as shown in Figure 14(a). In link disruption scenarios, a barrier
is created on each link, and the shortest path identifies new routes. Figure 14(b) compares the
outputs of the shortest path analysis with a link disruption. The network shows the routes taken by
evacuees. If the grey link is disrupted, whole orange links remain unused due to the changed
shortest paths of the disrupted link users.
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Figure 14. (a) Traversed edges by all OD trips (b) An example of a link disruption output.

Overall, this study assesses over 3.4 million links in the Gulf coast and Houston area, which creates
a significant computational burden to simulate a link disruption and estimate changes in link
volumes. The authors identify the most vulnerable links that are prone to flood using a geographic
proximity to the past disruption. This study selects links that are within 400 feet of disruptions
during Hurricane Harvey and assume they have a high likelihood of flooding or high-water damage
in a future event. As a result, Table 3 shows the total number of links used for the further analysis
categorized by risk areas and critical zones.

Table 3. Total number of evacuation links by zone and criterion.

Risk Area

Socially Vulnerable
Zones (High SVI Index)

Area 1 (Highest)
Area 2
Area 3
Area 4
Area 5S
Area 5N (Lowest)

69
57
73
42
45
40

Critical Zones
Economically
Vulnerable Zones
(High Property Value)
43
44
72
46
53
54

Environmentally
Vulnerable Zones
(High Flood Risk)
82
65
98
77
50
82

6.4. Critical Links
Altogether, the study identifies 173 links used by socially vulnerable critical zones, 163 links by
economically vulnerable critical zones, and 222 links by environmentally vulnerable critical zones.
These numbers differ from the subtotal of each criterion shown in Table 3 because many of the
links are selected by multiple critical zones.
In order to understand how the links differently serve critical zones, the study identifies the most
critical links based on conventional and user-based performance measures. Links selected by each
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performance measure are classified into 3 groups referring to as the most critical, moderately
critical, and less critical links, and the most critical links are only used for the comparisons. In this
comparative analysis, the links selected by a particular performance measure (e.g., link length) by
each critical zone (e.g., socially vulnerable zones) are compared to the links selected by other
measures (e.g., traffic volume, travel time, user-based) in the same zones.
Table 4 compares the link shares selected by different performance measures. For each critical
zone, the most critical links selected by conventional performance measures (e.g., traffic volume)
are compared with other conventional measures (e.g., length and travel time) and the user-based
measure. For example, among the links serving socially vulnerable zones, the most critical links
selected based on the traffic volume measure share 51% of their links with a link set selected by
the travel time measure. However, the same set of links selected by the traffic volume share only
18% of links with the user-based measure. This indicates that the critical links carrying high
evacuation traffic may not connect socially vulnerable communities; therefore, prioritizing
resources to such high-volume links may disproportionately affect socially vulnerable
communities. Similarly, among the links selected based on economic vulnerability, the only 37.5%
common links occur between the travel time-based and user-based set of links. Finally, among the
links selected based on environmental vulnerability, the percentage of shared links remains less
than 30% between those selected by link-based measures and environmentally vulnerable users.
Table 4. Percentage of links selected by different performance measures.

Link-based
Critical Zones

Performance Measure
Volume Travel Time

Socially
Vulnerable Zones

Economically
Vulnerable Zones

Environmentally
Vulnerable Zones

User-based
Social
Economic
Vulnerability Vulnerability

Environmental
Vulnerability

Link Length 31.6%
Linkbased Traffic Volume
-

47.4%

18%

-

-

51%

24.6%

-

-

Travel Time

-

3.6%

-

-

Link Length 33.3%
Linkbased Traffic Volume
-

48.1%

-

25.9%

-

41.7%

-

37.5%

-

Travel Time

-

-

29.4%

-

Link Length 29.3%
Linkbased Traffic Volume
-

46.7%

-

-

29.3%

47.9%

-

-

27.4%

Travel Time

-

-

-

27.8%

-

-

-

The study also compares the most critical links identified the user-based measures with one another
since the performance measures within the thrust of vulnerabilities could select different links as
the most critical ones to serve different vulnerable communities. This study identifies that that
21% of links serving socially vulnerable zones also serve economically vulnerable or
environmentally vulnerable zones; however, economically and environmentally vulnerable zones
only share 9% of their links.
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Figure 15 compares the most critical links identified by user-based measures (Figure 15(a)) and a
link-based measure, i.e., change in travel time, (Figure 15(b)) identified for all socially,
economically, and environmentally vulnerable zones. The link-based measures select the links
more sparsely and mostly on major highways while the user-based measures identify links in
denser areas where more vulnerable populations will use them.

Figure 15. Most critical links identified by: (a) user-based measures; (b) link-based measures.

Figure 16 presents the spatial distribution of critical links from all risk zones selected by the three
vulnerability criteria. Many links in risk zones 1 and 2 share the same links regardless of the
vulnerability criteria because their evacuees use a limited number of links to reach major
evacuation routes due to the sparse network. For other zones, however, the three vulnerability
criteria select different links. For Zone 1, road segments of the major highways I-45, Beltway 8,
SH 288, SH 35, and SH 36 are identified critical by all criteria, while long segments of FM 2004
are critical to serve socially vulnerable zones. For Zone 2, critical links are mostly found east of
Houston such as I-10 eastbound and I-610 northbound, even though each vulnerability criterion
selects different links in this region. Zone 3 shows the links selected by most diverse criteria
combinations, which select many links on I-10 and I-610. However, links in the inner city of
Houston are selected by all criteria since the Houston network mainly connects local origins to
outer destination areas. On the other hand, Zone 4 shows the most links selected by a single
criterion including long segments on SH 36 and FM 1301 used by environmentally vulnerable
zones. A noticeable link is the segment of SH 36 which mainly serves environmental vulnerable
zones in risk area 4 while it serves all three critical zones for risk areas 1 and 3. For Zones 5S and
5N, most of critical links are located in the inner city except a few link segments on I-10 which
appear to serve all critical zones that connect to the Beaumont region.
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Figure 16. Critical Links Selected by Vulnerability Criteria (a-e) and Network System (f).
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6.5. Interactive GIS Map
The final outputs of this study are presented in an online GIS map where the users can find the
critical links and the associated attributes of each link such as the criticality value measured by
different metrics. This interactive visualization also includes other layers and data used throughout
this study, e.g., evacuation zones, evacuation destinations, and trip distribution results. Any future
updates and changes will be applied to this map. The developed online GIS map and a brief
summary of the research can be accessed by using this link: https://utaarcgis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=ff6b75f6238843af956e238cf3724aa3
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7. CONCLUSION
Historically, critical links for disaster responses rely on measures that capture the overall
performance of a link disruption on the network. The links that their disruption causes higher travel
cost and increases travel time or reduces throughput appear to have a higher priority for protection
or restoration during an emergency. The performance measures that represent the clearance time
and travel length for evacuees remain important to achieve system efficiencies in evacuation.
However, the most important performance measure for evacuation from natural disasters such as
major hurricanes is lives saved; therefore, the impacts of link disruptions that could result in more
devastating consequences for some communities, especially for socially or economically
vulnerable ones require special attention. These vulnerable populations lack the resources to
withstand a hurricane if isolated; therefore, a failed evacuation could result in significant (lifethreatening) consequences.
This study proposes a methodology to identify the critical evacuation links by integrating the
vulnerability measures of communities. Three vulnerability measures including social, economic,
and environmental vulnerability create critical zones to provide more attention and priorities to
vulnerable communities for evacuation. A travel demand model integrates the findings from
important evacuation behavior analysis studies based on real-data and calculates the trips
generated from selected critical zones and distributed to safe destinations. A pool of evacuation
links more susceptible to flooding based on recent tropical storm experiences identify the critical
zones.
The results show that the critical links selected by the user-based measures do not always remain
critical when applying conventional link-based measures. The critical links used by vulnerable
users do not necessarily result in a significant impact on the general evacuee’s throughput due to
the geographical locations of the vulnerable populations. Even the critical links selected by the
vulnerable users differ as only 49% of the links are shared by all three vulnerable communities,
which raises an important question for decision-makers to determine critical links to prioritize
restoration and protection for evacuation. Differences between demographic, economic, and land
use characteristics of different risk zones creates variations in the criticality of the links.
The framework developed in this study can be used to identify the routes serving the highly
vulnerable population during evacuation and disaster relief phase. This study finds those
communities at higher risk to suffer from longer-term consequences, which would potentially
result in higher mortality rate if not evacuated or impose higher economic impacts. Therefore, the
location of disaster relief points can be assessed, or new locations added, if required, by
considering the criticality of roads serving the vulnerable population who might require various
emergency and relief help during different disaster stages.
The findings of this research provide a fundamental insight into the role of network infrastructure
for evacuation. The network links achieve the overall system efficiencies like higher throughput
and shortest travel time to equally serve all communities may exist. However, when applying a
lens of equity, those links may not save the lives of vulnerable populations. The selection of
critical links can vary depending on what criteria decision-makers prioritize. For evacuation
planning and hurricane preparedness, the vulnerability of road users must be incorporated into the
formula that selects the critical links.
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Using the suggested framework, a more comprehensive study can compare the critical links
identified by user-based measures and link-based measures such as change in travel cost of
evacuees at a larger-scale network. This can help to better understand the difference between these
two measures and develop a framework that can identify the critical links by using an index that
captures both measures and ranks the most critical links. Future study will also expand the work
and develop operational strategies that enhance network resilience and community survivability
based on the critical links that serve vulnerable road users. The framework may also be expanded
to prioritize links during the recovery process.
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APPENDIX A. CRITICAL LINKS IDENTIFIED BY DIFFERENT USERBASED CRITICALITY MEASURES

Figure A.1. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 1.

Figure A.2. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 1.
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Figure A.3. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 1.

Figure A.4. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 2.
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Figure A.5. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 2.

Figure A.6. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 2.
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Figure A.7. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 3.

Figure A.8. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 3.
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Figure A.9. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 3.

Figure A.10. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 4.
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Figure A.11. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 4.

Figure A.12. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 4.
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Figure A.13. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 5S.

Figure A.14. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 5S.
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Figure A.15. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 5S.

Figure A.16. Critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs in Zone 5N.
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Figure A.17. Critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs in Zone 5N.

Figure A.18. Critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs in Zone 5N.

48

APPENDIX B. MOST CRITICAL LINKS IDENTIFIED BY DIFFERENT
USER-BASED AND LINK-BASED CRITICALITY MEASURES

Figure B.1. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by average SVI.

Figure B.2. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by average economic vulnerability.
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Figure B.3. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by average environmental vulnerability.

Figure B.4. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by change in travel time.
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Figure B.5. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by link length.

Figure B.6. Most critical links identified for socially vulnerable CTs ranked by link volume.
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Figure B.7. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by average SVI.

Figure B.8. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by average economic vulnerability.
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Figure B.9. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by average environmental vulnerability.

Figure B.10. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by change in travel time.

53

Figure B.11. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by link length.

Figure B.12. Most critical links identified for economically vulnerable CTs ranked by link volume.
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Figure B.13. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by average SVI.

Figure B.14. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by average economic vulnerability.
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Figure B.15. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by average environmental
vulnerability.

Figure B.16. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by change in travel time.
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Figure B.17. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by link length.

Figure B.18. Most critical links identified for environmentally vulnerable CTs ranked by link volume.
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